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Abstract  
The action-effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) is one of the most widely cited and replicated 
effects in the regret literature, showing that negative outcomes are regretted more when they are 
a result of action compared to inaction. Building on theoretical arguments by norm theory 
(Kahneman & Miller, 1986) and the concept of normality, we examine the role of social norms 
for action and inaction in affecting regret. In four experiments we manipulated social norms and 
action-effect scenarios and found that social norms matter. For decisions resulting in negative 
outcomes, action is regretted more than inaction when social norms are for inaction, but when 
social norms are for action the effect is significantly weakened (Experiments 1 and 4) or reversed 
(Experiments 2 and 3). 
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Norm theory and the action-effect: The role of social norms in regret  




Life is filled with regrets, negative emotions associated with the perception that a choice 
should have been made differently. Some of the regrets are about actions taken, like “I should not 
have chosen this line of work”, whereas other regrets are about actions that were not taken 
(inaction), such as “I should have continued to a do a masters’ degree”. However, actions and 
inaction are not regretted equally, even if they lead to exactly the same outcome. There are 
fundamental biases associated with regrets of actions and inactions that have been shown to 
impact many aspects of life, including but not limited to decision-making (Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 
1997; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), self-regulation, well-being, 
and health (Mandel, Hilton, & Catellani, 2007; Roese, 1997, 2005; Zeelenberg, 1999). 
The action-effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) describes a phenomenon in which people 
regret actions leading to negative outcomes more than they do inactions leading to the same 
negative outcomes. It is considered one of the most well-known replicable findings in the regret 
literature (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995) and has been shown to generalize across domains and 
cultures (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Connolly, Ordonez, & Coughlan, 1997; Gilovich & Medvec, 
1994, 1995; Gilovich, Medvec, & Chen, 1995; Landman, 1987; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997; 
Ritov & Baron, 1995; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998).  
Over the last two decades, researchers have begun revealing factors that moderate and 
even reverse the action-effect. One of these factors, for example, is temporal distance, and 
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studies have shown that the action-effect happens for current or recent decisions (“hot” strong 
emotions), but when contemplating temporally distant events in the past the action-effect is 
reversed and inactions are regretted more than actions (“wistful” nostalgia) (Bonnefon & Zhang, 
2008; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995; Gilovich, Medvec, & Kahneman, 1998; Kahneman, 
1995). Other examples are individual differences (e.g., regulatory focus; Roese, Hur, & 
Pennington, 1999), cognitive accessibility (Rajagopal, Raju, & Unnava, 2006), and 
controllability (N'gbala & Branscombe, 1995). Meaning, that there are various factors which 
affect how actions and inactions are perceived and processed, and these in turn lead to a weaker 
action-effect or even a reversal to an inaction-effect.  
The present investigation extends previous literature by incorporating a social perspective 
to highlight social norms as an important factor that moderates the action-effect. Studies of 
norms (norm theory, Kahneman & Miller, 1986) in the context of the action-effect have mainly 
focused on past behavior (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Baron & Ritov, 1994) and expected contextual 
behavior (Zeelenberg, Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002). However, the role of broad 
social norms remains unclear with inconsistent findings regarding the impact of cultural social 
norms for the action-effect and related action-inaction biases. For example, some scholars found 
no cross-cultural differences in regrets for action and inaction (Gilovich, Wang, Regan, & 
Nishina, 2003) whereas others found cultural differences in regret for action and inaction in some 
domains (Chen, Chiu, Roese, Tam, & Lau, 2006; Komiya, Watabe, Miyamoto, & Kusumi, 2013). 
We therefore aimed for a direct investigation of the role of social norms for the action-effect.  
We begin by reviewing norm theory and findings related to the underlying core concept 
of normality, proceed to discuss the different normality categories and related findings regarding 
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the action-effect, then highlight gaps and inconsistencies in the normality category of social 
norms, and finally theorize and test the role of social norms for the action-effect. 
Normality 
Regret occurs when a person is faced with an outcome that triggers the thought of what 
could have happened differently to result in a different outcome (counterfactual thinking). Norm 
theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) offered a conceptual framework highlighting normality as an 
important factor in the experience of regret. The theory argues that the affective response to an 
outcome is affected by the magnitude of the difference between the expected outcome and the 
actual outcome. Events are cognitively classified as normal or abnormal, with abnormal 
outcomes being more cognitively mutable than normal outcomes. Meaning, that it is harder to 
elicit alternatives to an expected normal behavior than it is to imagine alternatives to an 
unexpected abnormal behavior. Therefore, higher mutability and more abnormal outcomes elicit 
more counterfactual thought and therefore more regret. For example, the decision to take a 
certain road from point A to point B is evaluated in regards to whether taking this road deviates 
from one’s typical behavior. If taking a certain road is an unusual behavior and something bad 
happens, then the negative outcome would elicit more counterfactual thought of what might have 
been and hence higher likelihood for regret, but if a chosen road is perceived as normal for the 
person then there is less likelihood for counterfactual thinking and regret. To act consistently 
with normal and accepted behavior reflects a more careful and justified decision process (Reb & 
Connolly, 2010; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002), which affects the degree to which the involved 
actor is held accountable when events turn bad (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) and also the 
degree to which the person would feel bad and regretful about the decision. 
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The perception of normality, whether a behavior is normal or abnormal, affects feelings 
of regret, but what is normal? Normal can be evaluated using several types of normality 
(Koonce, Miller, & Winchel, 2015), most notably – (1) the extent to which a behavior is similar 
to past behavior (sometimes referred to as intrapersonal normality; Roese, 1997), (2) the extent 
to which an event or a behavior is unusual or unexpected, and (3) the extent to which a behavior 
resembles or conforms to the behavior of others.  
Kahneman and Miller (1986) discussed an example highlighting the contrast between 
different types of normality and their impact on regret:  
Mr. Jones almost never takes hitch-hikers in his car. Yesterday 
he gave a man a ride and was robbed. Mr. Smith frequently 
takes hitch-hikers in his car. Yesterday he gave a man a ride and 
was robbed. Who do you expect to experience greater regret 
over the episode? 
The normality discussed in the above scenario is in regards to the person’s past behavior. 
In their sample, 88% of 138 participants answered that Mr. Jones – who acted abnormally in 
comparison to his usual behavior - would be more regretful than Mr. Smith who acted as he 
normally would. Meaning, that the degree to which the action is perceived normal in the person’s 
life would impact feelings of regret when things go wrong. However, Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) also asked “who will be criticized most severely by others?”, which refers to social norms 
for behavior, and in response to the norms question 77% of participants rated that Mr. Smith - 
who typically takes hitchhikers - would be criticized more. Their findings suggest that the 
feelings of regret in the above scenario were more about normality in terms of the person’s past 
behavior rather than the social norms of what society perceives to be as normal and acceptable.  
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Normality and the action-effect 
Normality, therefore, plays a role in feelings of regret in decision making, in that 
abnormal easily-mutable behavior is regretted more than normal behavior. To address 
implications of norm theory for the regret for action versus inaction, Kahneman and Miller 
(1986) suggested that the action-effect could be interpreted using the concept of normality. 
Meaning, inactions could be seen as normal and actions considered unusual, which would make 
it cognitively easier to think of counterfactuals for action than for inaction, and as a result actions 
are more regretted than inactions (Roese, 1997). However, Kahneman and Miller (1986) did not 
discuss or contrast between the different types of normality in terms of the action-effect, and 
their arguments seem as if assuming inaction social norms (Landman, 1987). The literature 
regarding action-effect that followed has largely used normality as a broad term but focused on 
intrapersonal normality (Roese, 1997). 
In reference to the types of normality discussed in the previous section, the normality 
explanation for the action-effect could either be that - (1) the perceived typical past behavior in 
the action-effect scenarios is to not act, (2) inaction is the typical expected behavior in the 
situation or role in the action-effect scenarios, or that (3) the perceived general social norms in 
the action-effect scenarios are for the person to not act. In terms of the implications for norm 
theory, the action-effect would be weakened and possibly reversed when – (1) perceived past 
behavior is to act, (2) the expected behavior in the situation or role is to act, (3) the perceived 
general social norms are to act. Below, we discuss the literature regarding each of those 
categories. 
First, the implications of the past behavior normality on action-inaction biases were 
examined in a number of studies looking at the omission-bias. The omission-bias is an action-
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inaction bias regarding people’s preference for inaction (omission) over action (commission) 
under risky situations with possible negative outcomes (Anderson, 2003; Ritov & Baron, 1990). 
Building on the action-effect, the theory is that actions are generally perceived as being more 
intentional and accountable and people aim to minimize the risk of being held accountable for 
negative outcomes. The effect was initially illustrated using decision making regarding 
vaccinations – that people consider the risk of harm from vaccinations (action) side-effects as 
more serious than the risk of harm from not vaccinating (inaction) and getting sick (for a 
summary, see Baron & Ritov, 2004). Similar to the action-effect, there have been findings 
showing a weakening of the bias, even at times resulting in a commission-bias or action-bias 
(Reb & Connolly, 2010), arguably due to various moderating factors, such as personal 
responsibility (Baron & Ritov, 2004). Studies on the omission bias have generally concluded that 
the action-inaction biases were stronger than past behavior and that the higher regret for action 
over inaction was not affected by what the typical behavior for the person was (Ritov & Baron, 
1992; Baron & Ritov, 1994). These findings may seem surprising given the strong evidence for 
the past behavior normality for feelings of regret in general situations (Kahneman & Miller, 
1986), which we discussed in the previous section. However, it might mean that the social 
expectations or norms for inaction over action are so strong, that they render one’s own past 
behavior less relevant. 
Second, looking at normality in terms of expected behavior, Bar-Eli, Azar, Ritov, Keidar-
Levin and Schein (2007) studied soccer goalkeepers. They showed that the expected behavior for 
soccer goal-keepers was to jump to either side in order to appear trying to prevent a goal rather 
than to remain at the center and appear passive, even if the chances of blocking the ball were 
essentially the same (25 versus 7 goalkeepers surveyed perceived action as the norm, p. 615). In 
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such cases, they argued, regret over not preventing a goal – a negative outcome for the 
goalkeeper and the team - is higher following an inaction of remaining in the center than it is for 
taking action to jump to either side. Their data was only partly supportive and there was no 
manipulation or comparison to other expected behaviors, yet it suggests that the action-effect 
could be reversed if the behavioral expectations for a specific role were to act. In this context, the 
irrelevance of personal past behavior seems logical, as even a goal keeper’s own behavioral 
record of remaining inactive in the center may not reduce the regret associated with not jumping 
to either side, if the normative expectations are for the goal keeper to jump. Zeelenberg et al. 
(2002) attempted to more directly manipulate behavioral expectations. They demonstrated that 
prior negative outcomes reversed the action-effect to an inaction-effect resulting in higher regret 
associated with inaction, presumably because prior negative actions are informative of the need 
to take corrective action rather than remain passive and do nothing. 
Finally, looking at normality in terms of social norms, several studies have looked at 
cross-cultural differences in the action-effect. Gilovich, et al. (2003) found that across cultures 
people more easily elicit additive counterfactuals than subtractive counterfactuals. However, 
there are indications for some cross-cultural differences in regret. Chen et al. (2006) found 
general consistency regarding regret for inaction for both Americans and Chinese, but also 
showed that Chinese regretted action more than Americans, especially in certain life domains 
(school and family). Komiya et al. (2013) found that for Americans the action-effect was mainly 
about regret for negative outcomes for the self, whereas for Japanese the action-effect was 
mainly about regret for negative outcomes affecting other people. These findings are suggestive 
of the subtle nuances of social norms in terms of feelings of regret. 
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Studies on the related omission-bias regarding vaccination decisions further examined 
whether omission-bias would be affected by manipulating normality through perceptions of the 
perceived standard treatment (Baron & Ritov, 2004) or the perceptions of close others’ behavior 
(Reb & Connolly, 2010). Interestingly, there is a heated debate whether the omission-bias is real 
for vaccination decisions, with Baron and Ritov claiming consistent evidence for social norms to 
not vaccinate (inaction), and Connolly and Reb raising doubts over these findings claiming social 
norms to vaccinate (action), but regardless, both groups of scholars concluded no effect for the 
manipulation of normality for the action-inaction bias (Baron & Ritov, 2004; Reb & Connolly, 
2010). Given the different assumptions and findings regarding the social norms for vaccination 
by the two groups of scholars, it is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the role of social 
norms. It could very well be that normality reflected by perceptions of what close others would 
do or not do in terms of vaccinations (Reb & Connolly, 2010) or the perceptions of the default 
option in terms of standard treatment (Baron & Ritov, 2004) simply did not matter given stronger 
social norms about whether to vaccinate or not. 
The present investigation 
The present investigation examines the implications of social norms for regret 
experienced following action versus inaction, to address the empirical gap in testing norm theory 
theoretical arguments regarding the role of social norms normality in the action-effect. In four 
experiments we tested the impact of corporate norms (Experiment 1), workplace behavioral 
norms (Experiment 2), society norms (Experiment 3), and family norms (Experiment 4) for the 
classic action-effect investment scenario by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). The supplementary 
file includes power analyses and full materials for the four experiments, and data and code were 
made available on the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/gj5re/). 
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Experiment 1 
Method 
A total of 76 American participants were recruited online using Amazon Mechanical Turk 
in return for 0.25US$ (Mage = 35.25, SDage = 12.10; 36 females). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three norm conditions of action, inaction, and control.  
The classic Kahneman and Tversky (1982) investment scenario was adjusted for the 
purpose of the study. In all conditions, the scenario described two stock traders working for a 
financial firm: George, who switched investments (action), and Paul, who refrained from 
switching investments (inaction).  
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for [Company] [...] 
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he 
considered switching to invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. 
He now finds out that the investment would have been better off by 
$1,000,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.  
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year 
he switched the investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the 
investment would have been better off by $1,000,000 if he had kept his 
investment in stock for company B.  
The scenario above represents a slight adjustment to the classic scenario in that in this 
experiment Paul and George invested on behalf of a company rather than investing 
independently. Departing from prior studies, the scenario also included a direct manipulation of 
the company norms presented in the first sentence of the scenario above, as follows:  
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Action condition: A&M Finance strongly emphasizes actions and proactive 
decision making, shows a clear preference for action over inaction, and 
evaluates its employees based on their ability to act and actively seek out 
good investments. 
Inaction condition: B&N Finance strongly emphasizes cautious and 
responsible decision making, shows a clear preference for inaction over 
action, and evaluates its employees based on their ability to refrain from 
undertaking bad investments. 
The control condition for the norm manipulation did not indicate a preference for either 
action or inaction. The scenario was followed by four quiz questions the participants had to 
answer correctly before proceeding, meant to verify the understanding of the scenario. 
Following the scenario, participants were presented with a manipulation check examining 
company preference for action versus inaction ("who do you think the company considers to be a 
better stock broker?"; 1 = Paul – didn’t switch; 2 = George - switched), followed by the original 
question by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) regarding which of the two persons experienced 
higher regret ("who feels greater regret over his investment decision?"; 1 = Paul – didn’t switch; 
2 = George - switched).  
Results and Discussion 
An analysis of the manipulation-check indicated that the manipulation of norms was 
successful, and the company in the action condition was perceived as favoring action-taking 
more than the inaction and control conditions (inaction: 87% indicating inaction as more 
normative; control: 76%; action: 48%; χ2 (2, N = 76) = 10.02, p = .007; see Figure 1).  
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In support of the hypothesis that social norms influence regret, the manipulation of 
company norms significantly influenced perceived regret (χ2 (2, N = 76) = 6.32, p = .042; see 
Figure 1 for a summary). Specifically, the highest percentage of participants who perceived 
greater regret for action was in the inaction norms condition (88%), with a lower rate in the 
control condition (72%), and the lowest rate in the action norms condition (56%). Action and 
inaction norms conditions were significantly different from each other (χ2 (1, N = 51) = 6.25, p 
= .012, d = .75) but not from the control condition (χ2 < 1.8, p > .18). 
Examining participants' responses to perceived social norms over perceived regret for 
action versus inaction across conditions, the effect was much stronger. Most participants who 
rated company norms as inaction indicated higher regret for action over inaction (87% action), 
whereas most participants who rated company norms as action indicated higher regret for 
inaction over action (35% action; χ2 (1, N = 76) = 21.10, p < .001, d = 1.24). 
In summary, findings showed initial support for the norm theory hypothesis that social 
norms affect perceptions of regret.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to replicate Experiment 1 using another conceptualization of 
norms and then extend Experiment 1 by also addressing the possibility of an alternative 
explanation for the findings - intent. Together with the action-effect, perceived intent and 
responsibility are the key factors leading to the omission-bias, the preference for inaction over 
action when there is the possibility of harm, presumably in order to avoid the assumption of 
responsibility (Baron & Ritov, 1994). Previous research has also shown that the perceived intent 
affects counterfactual thinking and regret, as deliberate intentional behavior is more easily 
mutable (Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; Markman, Gavanski, Sherman, & McMullen, 1995). 
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Normality and social norms can be seen as factors that constrain control and reduce 
responsibility. We therefore added a manipulation of intent. 
Method 
A total of 154 American participants were recruited online using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk (Mage = 36.42, SDage = 12.42; 84 females) in return for 0.25US$. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2x3 between-subject design with two 
manipulations – perceived norms (action, inaction, neutral) and intent (deliberate, random). A 
manipulation check question was used to verified the manipulation for perceived norms, and it 
was followed by questions examining regret, perceived responsibility, and perceived intent. 
Perceived norms manipulation. As in Experiment 1 we manipulated perceived 
behavioral norms with three conditions - action norms, inaction norms, neutral. The norms 
manipulation differed slightly from Experiment 1. We sought to replicate and extend norms 
perception to include perceptions of others’ behavior, to more closely capture the idea of social 
behavior rather than corporate policy. Using social behavioral norms also reduces concerns that 
the change in regret is due to fear of corporate sanctions for non-conforming behavior. Therefore, 
the adjusted manipulation varied information about the common values and behavior of company 
employees, as described below: 
Action condition: Stock traders working for A&M Finance are very action 
driven, eager and proactive decision makers, strongly valuing action over 
inaction. The norms in this company are for people to keep looking for new 
opportunities for investment with the unofficial motto of "go for it!". 
Inaction condition: Stock traders working for B&N Finance are very careful 
and cautious decision makers, strongly valuing the status-quo over taking 
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action. The norms in this company are for people to not act unless they are 
certain it is necessary, with the unofficial motto of "if it isn't broken, don't fix 
it!". 
The neutral condition did not indicate other employees’ preference for action or inaction. 
Intent manipulation. We introduced a manipulation of intent to examine whether intent 
interacted with norms. The intent conditions were identical to the scenarios detailed in 
Experiment 1, describing the decision that Paul and George as their own intentional decision. In 
the no-intent conditions we ruled out intent by indicating that Paul and George reached their 
decisions whether to act or not solely based on a random coin toss. Hence, in the no-intent 
conditions the decision of whether to switch or not switch was random and not deliberate, and 
therefore did not reflect any personal preference for action or inaction.  
Dependent measures. As in Experiment 1, participants were asked to compare the two 
employees on various dimensions. Participants were asked which of the two experienced higher 
regret ("Who feels greater regret over his investment decision?"; 1 = Paul – didn’t switch; 2 = 
George - switched), was more intentional and deliberate ("Whose decision was more deliberate 
and intentional?"; 1 = Paul – didn’t switch; 2 = George - switched), and more responsible for the 
outcome of their decision ("Who is more responsible for the bad outcome of their decision?"; 1 = 
Paul – didn’t switch; 2 = George - switched).  
Results and Discussion 
The intent manipulation had no effect on the results and did not interact with the norms 
manipulation. There were no significant differences between the random versus non-random 
conditions regarding perceptions of norms (χ2(1, 154) = .06, p = .868ns), regret (χ2(1, 154) = 
2.84, p = .119ns), responsibility (χ2(1, 154) = .16, p = .705ns), or intent (χ2(1, 154) = 1.67, p 
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= .236ns). Meaning, the action and norm related biases were not affected by whether the decision 
was made based on deliberation or was completely random. We therefore proceeded to report the 
results below for the entire sample regardless of the intent manipulation.  
An analysis of the manipulation-check indicated that the manipulation of norms was 
successful (total: χ2 (2, N = 154) = 42.86, p < .001; as explained above – with no effect for 
randomness manipulations - not-random: χ2 (2, N = 79) = 31.54, p < .001; random: χ2 (2, N = 75) 
= 13.20, p = .001; see Figure 2), with 93.5% of participants in the inaction condition indicating 
inaction as the norm but only 30% of those in the action condition indicating that the inaction 
investment decision was the more normative behavior. In the neutral condition, which had no 
indication of norms, 69% indicated that the inaction decision was the norm.  
The inaction norms and neutral conditions replicated the classic Kahneman and Tversky 
action-effect in which most participants rated higher regret for taking action (inaction: 87%; 
neutral: 70.7%). But, shifting the norms to action affected the classic Kahneman and Tversky 
action-effect with significantly lower percentage of participants indicating higher regret for 
action (48%; χ2 (2, N = 154) = 17.03, p < .001; see Figure 2). Action and inaction norms 
conditions were significantly different from each other (χ2 (1, N = 96) = 16.36, p < .001, d = .91) 
and from the control condition (action versus control: χ2 (1, N = 108) = 5.77, p = .016, d = .48; 
inaction versus control: χ2 (1, N = 104) = 3.95, p = .047, d = .40). 
The effect was stronger when directly examining participants' rated social norms with 
perceived regret. Most participants that rated company norms were for inaction rated higher 
regret for action over inaction (84% action), whereas most participants that rated company norms 
were for action rated higher regret for inaction over action (41% action; χ2 (1, N = 154) = 29.81, 
p < .001, d = .98). 
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The manipulation of norms did not affect perceived responsibility (χ2 (2, N = 154) = 2.39, 
p = .303ns) or perceived intent (χ2 (2, N = 154) = 2.01, p = .366ns). Examining intent across all 
conditions, in accordance with findings from the omission bias literature, a higher percentage of 
participants perceived actions as more intentional than inactions (65.6%) and a higher percentage 
of participant perceived acting agents as more responsible for the outcome of the investment 
(77.3%). Therefore, we conclude that the impact of social norms normality over the action-effect 
was not due to differences in perceptions of intent.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to replicate and extend Experiments 1 and 2 in several ways. 
First, we used a between-subject design separating action from inaction rather than an action-
inaction comparison. Second, we manipulated society norms rather than institutional norms, to 
examine the generalizability of the findings to society more broadly. Finally, we made an 
adjustment to the investment scenario so that the decision was taken by the self, rather than by 
others.  
Method 
A total of 122 American participants were recruited online using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk in return for 0.25US$. Seven of the participants failed comprehension checks in the 
scenario for the social norms manipulation and were therefore excluded leaving a sample of 116 
(Mage = 34.32, SDage = 11.76; 44 females), although removing these participants did not 
significantly affect the results (see full sample results in the supplementary). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2x2 between-subject design manipulating social 
norms (action versus inaction) and the investment decision (action versus inaction).  
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Participants were first presented with a hypothetical society either driven by action or by 
inaction social norms: 
Action social norms condition: Imagine a society that is mostly driven by 
action. Most, if not all, of the people living in this society are very proactive 
and action oriented, strongly valuing action over inaction. The norms in this 
society are for people to keep busy and minimize idle time. 
Inaction social norms condition: Imagine a society that is mostly driven by 
inaction. Most, if not all, of the people living in this society are very passive 
and oriented towards inaction, strongly valuing the status-quo over taking 
action. The norms in this society are for people to refrain from action and 
maximize idle time. 
The description was followed by comprehension checks to make sure the scenario was 
understood. Next, participants were asked to imagine that they were members of the described 
society and were then presented with an investment scenario. Participants were presented with 
either the action or the inaction in a between-subject design. The scenarios were: 
Action decision condition: You have recently inherited 1,000,000US$ which 
were already invested in the stocks of company Y. Credible reports indicated 
that the stock of a different company, company X, shows greater promise and 
potential for earnings. You have taken action and changed the investment 
from company Y to company X. At the end of the year you realize that you 
would have been better off by 200,000US$ had you not made the switch in 
investment. 
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Inaction decision condition: You have recently inherited 1,000,000US$ which 
were already invested in the stocks of company X. Credible reports indicated 
that the stock of a different company, company Z, shows greater promise and 
potential for earnings. However, you have not taken action and left the 
investment in company X instead of shifting the investment to company Z. At 
the end of the year you realize that you would have been better off by 
200,000US$ had you decided to make the switch in investment. 
Participants then answered regarding perceptions of regret ("in such a society, how likely 
are you to feel regret over your behavior in this situation?") on a seven-item scale (0 = Not at all; 
6 = Very much).  
Results and Discussion 
Means, standard deviations, and Cohen d are detailed in Table 1 and the findings are 
plotted in Figure 3.  
Replicating the findings from Experiments 1 and 2, a two-way ANOVA revealed that the 
social norms manipulation significantly moderated these effects and the interaction between the 
two manipulations was positive (F(1, 112) = 36.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .25, d = 1.15). In the society 
with the inaction social norms, the decision to switch (action) was perceived as higher regret 
(t(38.72) = 7.26, p < .001; d = 1.89), whereas in the action social norms society the regret for 
action decision was perceived marginally lower than the inaction decision (t(56.26) = 1.68, p 
= .098; d = -.43).  
Examining main effects, compared to inactions (decision not to switch), actions (decision 
to switch) leading to a negative outcome were attributed higher regret (action: N = 58, M = 4.74, 
SD = 1.68; inaction: N = 58, M = 3.55, SD = 2.26; d = .60; F(1, 112) = 14.31, p < .001; ηp2 =.11).  
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Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 was designed to replicate and extend Experiments 1-3 in several ways. 
First, we examined the role of decision justifiability and perceived sanctions for social norms 
over the action-effect (explained in detail below). Second, we adjusted the norms manipulation to 
family norms to examine social norms for close others in society rather than workplace norms 
(Experiments 1 and 2) or society norms more broadly (Experiment 3). Lastly, we aimed for a 
large sample and high power (0.99).  
Decision Justifiability Theory (DJT; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) argues that people 
tend to experience higher regret when decisions are not justifiable, and it is possible that social 
norms affect the perceived justifiability of action and inaction. Using DJT arguments, social 
norms for action may cause inaction to seem less justifiable and more regrettable, whereas social 
norms for inaction might make action less justifiable and more regrettable, offering an 
explanation for the effect found. We therefore added a measure of justifiability for action and 
inaction.  
Social norms may affect regret through perceptions of approval and sanctions (injunctive 
norms) or by means of setting the interpretive frame for what is the normative behavioral norm 
(descriptive norms) (Cialdini, 2003; Morris, Hong, Chiu, & Liu, 2015). It is possible that our 
manipulation of social norms affected regret because non-conforming agents were expected to 
receive stronger sanctions by the company (Experiment 1), others in the company (Experiment 
2), or society (Experiment 3). In Experiment 4 we aimed to examine the more conservative 
descriptive norms, by making the decision of whether to switch the investment or not private, 
thereby eliminating the possibility of sanctions due to non-conformity. We expected that social 
norms would affect regret for action and inaction even when the decision is private. 
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Method 
A total of 329 American participants were recruited online using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk in return for 0.35US$ (Mage = 39.97, SDage = 12.70; 178 females, 12 unreported). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions manipulating family social norms 
(action, inaction, and control). As in Experiments 1-3 participants were presented with the classic 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) investment scenario adjusted for a manipulation of norms. The 
norms manipulation differed from previous experiments in that inaction-Paul and action-George 
were from the same family and the description of the family norms varied between conditions, as 
described below: 
Action family norms: Paul and George are cousins who grew up in a family 
that values action. Most, if not all, of the family members are very proactive 
and action-oriented, strongly valuing taking action over inaction. The norms 
in this family are for family members to keep busy and minimize idle time. 
Inaction family norms: Paul and George are cousins who grew up in a family 
that values inaction. Most, if not all, of the family members are very passive 
and oriented towards inaction, strongly valuing the status-quo over taking 
action. The norms in this family are for family members to refrain from 
unnecessary action and maximize idle time.  
Control condition: Paul and George are cousins who grew up in the same 
family. 
 At the end of the description, we also added the following to indicate the decision to 
switch or not was private: 
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Paul and George's investment decisions are private, but the outcomes are 
public. Meaning, that the family never knows of the investment decisions 
made at any time, and Paul and George do not know of each other's decisions, 
but everyone in the family knows about the outcomes of both investment 
decisions. 
Participants answered six comprehension questions before proceeding to the next page, 
and two of these questions verified that participants understood that the decision whether to 
switch or not was private and that only the outcome was known (“Paul and George's investment 
decision regarding whether to switch the investment or not are...” and “The outcomes of Paul and 
George's investment decision are...” with a validated choice between Private/Public/We don’t 
know). 
Participants then proceeded to rate perceived justification for Paul and George’s 
decisions – “Paul's decision not to switch the investment is well justified” and “George's decision 
to switch the investment is well justified” (1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree), perceived 
family normative decision as the manipulation check – “Whose decision is probably more 
common in Paul and George's family?”, and perceived regret – “In your opinion, who feels 
greater regret over his investment decision” (1 = Definitely Paul's decision not to switch; 6 = 
Definitely George's decision to switch).  
Results and Discussion 
Means and standard deviations for all conditions with one-way ANOVA analyses results 
are detailed in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 4. Comparisons between the conditions with Cohen 
d effect size are detailed in Table 3. 
Running head: Action-inaction regret and social norms      23 
The manipulation of norms was successful (F(2, 326) = 173.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .52), and 
norms affected perceived regret (F(2, 326) = 9.11, p < .001, ηp2= .05). Participants rated 
perceived regret for action over inaction in the action norms condition as lower than the control 
condition (Mdiff = -.47, p < .001, d = -.36, CI [-.90, -.05]) and the inaction condition (Mdiff = -.74, 
p < .001, d = -.56, CI [-1.16, -.32]), but the differences in regret between the inaction and 
control condition were not significant (Mdiff = 21, p = .404, d = .21, CI [-.16, .68]). The norm 
manipulation did not significantly affect perceived justification for action (F(2, 326) = 1.83, p 
= .162ns, ηp2 = .01; comparisons d < .24) or inaction (F(2, 326) = .93, p = .394ns, ηp2 = .01; 
comparisons d
 
< .07).  
Experiment 4 replicated the findings in Experiment 1-3, using a manipulation of family 
social norms and affecting regret over a private decision. The experiment demonstrated the 
generalizability of the effect to descriptive norms without possible social sanctions. Justifications 
for action and inaction were not affected by social norms. 
General Discussion 
This research examined the role of perceived social norms for the classic Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) action-effect. In the action-effect, negative outcomes resulting from action are 
regretted more than the same negative outcomes resulting from inactions. Kahneman and 
Miller’s (1986) norm theory postulated that the action-effect can be explained by normality, 
meaning that actions are more abnormal than inactions and therefore more mutable, eliciting 
counterfactual thinking of what could have been and therefore higher regret. According to this 
theory, if normality would change such that actions would be perceived as more normal, then the 
action-effect may be weakened or even reversed. Our findings are in support of norm theory’s 
theoretical arguments and are summarized in Table 4. A manipulation of social norms showed 
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that the action-effect with higher perceived regret for action than for inaction occurred when 
norms were for inaction, but when norms were for taking action the action-effect was 
significantly weakened (Experiments 1 and 4) and even reversed (Experiments 2 and 3). Social 
norms were examined by a number of different ways, either as corporate set norms (Experiment 
1), coworkers’ behavior (Experiment 2), family norms (Experiment 4), or as norms for society as 
a whole (Experiment 3). The action-effect was examined either using the classic Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) paradigm comparing action and inaction in the same scenario (Experiments 1, 2, 
and 4), or by manipulating action and inaction in a between-subject design (Experiment 3).  
These findings contribute to the extant literature on the action-effect. Action-effect has 
long been considered one of the most replicated finding in the regret literature (Gilovich & 
Medvec, 1995), and the control conditions in Experiments 1, 2, and 4 replicated the action-effect 
that most people perceived regret for action as higher than regret for inaction. In the last two 
decades, studies revealed various factors which moderate the action-effect, such as temporal 
distance (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995), or individual differences (Roese et al., 1999), and 
our findings highlight perceived social norms as one such factor.  
Our findings also contribute to the understanding of action-effect in regards to the 
theoretical arguments made by norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Norm theory refers to 
the higher mutability of abnormal compared to normal events leading to higher regret for 
abnormal behaviors, yet normality can be either in terms of past behavior, situational or role 
expectations, or social norms. Norm theory and related literature have not clearly linked between 
the different normality categories and the action-effect, vaguely referring to actions being more 
abnormal than inaction. Previous attempts examining normality for the action-effect have shown 
mixed results with some studies finding no effect (Ritov & Baron, 1992; Baron & Ritov, 1994, 
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2004; Reb & Connolly, 2010), some studies finding an effect through indirect proxies (prior 
outcomes; Zeelenberg et al., 2002), and some cross-cultural studies suggestive of some 
differences in regret between cultures that differ on action-inaction norms (Chen et al., 2006; 
Komiya et al., 2013). Importantly, these studies examined normality in different ways referring 
to different normality categories, which may partially explain the inconsistencies. We therefore 
recognized the need to evaluate and discuss findings on norm theory and the action-effect based 
on the type of normality assessed. We also identified that the findings regarding normality in 
terms of social norms have so far been inconsistent. We therefore set out to directly examine the 
implications of social norms normality for the action-effect, and our findings consistently 
showed that social norms do indeed matter. 
How social norms affect regret 
We found consistent support for the social norms as moderating the action-effect. 
According to norm theory this effect is caused by actions being perceived as less normal, and it 
is the higher mutability of unusual action behavior compared to normative inaction behavior 
which leads to stronger counterfactual thinking resulting in higher regret for action. Decision 
Justifiability Theory (DJT; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002) offers a complementary explanation 
for the action-effect focusing on justifiability, meaning that actions are less justifiable than 
inactions when outcomes are negative, and are therefore regretted more. Social norms, therefore, 
may affect the justifiability of actions and inactions, thereby affecting regret. In Experiment 4 we 
tested DJT by measuring action and inaction justifiability but found no support for a shift in 
justifiability as a result of the changing norms. 
Social norms can be categorized into injunctive norms and descriptive norms (Cialdini, 
2003). Injunctive norms capture perceptions of what is socially acceptable, whereas descriptive 
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norms are about perceptions of the behaviors usually performed by others. Regret for action and 
inaction may be affected by both, so that those who deviate from social norms regret their 
choices because they worry that others would disapprove or sanction them (injunctive) or they 
may regret their choices because their choices were different than that of others (descriptive) 
(Morris et al., 2015). In Experiment 4 we specifically targeted descriptive norms and found that 
the impact of social norms over the action-effect replicated even when the decision whether to 
act or not was private, meaning that regret is most likely not due to fear of sanctions or 
disapproval over the decision made. Therefore, both types of social norms can affect regret, and 
we expect that the change in regret would be strongest when there is a change in both injunctive 
and descriptive norms (Cialdini, 2003). 
Implications and Future Directions 
Norm theory assumptions regarding the action-effect were that in the decision between 
switching (action) and not switching (inaction) an investment the normal behavior would be not 
to switch (inaction). In Experiments 1 and 2, 76% and 69% of the participants in the control 
condition perceived inaction to be the norm, respectively. These descriptive findings support the 
norm theory assumptions, yet raise an interesting question as to why the social norms in the 
investment scenario are for inaction. Interestingly, recent findings in the action-inaction values 
literature argue for the opposite, suggesting that the broad norms in society are to take action, 
even more so in the west (Ireland, Hepler, Li, & Albarracín, 2015; Levine & Norenzayan, 1999; 
Zell et al., 2013). The inaction norms in the action-effect investment scenario in an action driven 
society may reflect a cognitive bias. Meaning, that the mere presentation of the negative 
outcomes in the investment scenario shifts perceived norms from action to inaction.  
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The action-effect has mainly focused on negative outcomes, but it has been shown that 
the action-effect also extends to positive outcomes and feelings of elation, meaning that positive 
outcomes are more enjoyable when they are a result of actions compared to inactions (Landman, 
1987). While it may seem that the same norm theory assumptions and arguments would extend 
to positive outcomes, we are not aware of studies examining the effects of normality for the 
action-effect for positive feelings in the context of positive outcomes. Some of the previous 
research has shown that some moderators do not moderate regret and elation in the same way 
(van Dijk & van der Pligt, 1997) and recent findings found asymmetries between positive and 
negative outcomes on the omission-bias (Bostyn & Roets, 2016). It is possible that the effect of 
perceived social norms over positive outcomes would be different, as well as the way by which 
social norms affect processing of actions and inaction in that situation. 
We found that social norms matter, and we can therefore expect that different cultures 
with different values and attitudes towards action and inaction would show differences in the 
action-effect. Cross-cultural studies of action and inaction values revealed significant differences 
between countries in action-inaction related attitudes, especially showing a contrast between east 
and west (Zell et al., 2013). Several studies have shown consistency in counterfactual thinking 
and regret across cultures (Gilovich et al., 2003), which could be interpreted as consistency in the 
action-effect, yet other follow-up studies have revealed some cultural differences between 
Americans and Chinese (Chen et al., 2006) and between Americans and Japanese (Komiya et al., 
2013), which suggests that social norms do play a role. The impact of social norms may extend 
beyond action-inaction norms to other cultural aspects, such as whether a behavior is thought of 
as mainly intended for the self (e.g., individualism) or for others (e.g., collectivism, power 
distance), or time-related beliefs and values (e.g., long-term orientation).  
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The classic action-effect investment scenario by Kahneman and Tversky (1982) asked 
participants to evaluate and compare others’ feelings of regret, making a dichotomous choice 
about who experiences higher regret between an action actor and an inaction actor. Over the 
years, many adjustments to this scenario have been proposed and tested, and while the action-
effect has been shown to replicate well, research has identified several methodological 
moderators that impact the strength of the effect. Experiments 1 and 2 used the original 
experimental stimuli to establish social norms as a moderator, yet in Experiment 3 we adjusted 
the experimental paradigm to address many of the possible moderators. Experiment 3 used a 
between-subject design for action and inaction to address comparisons to address possible 
concerns of weaker effects in between-subject designs (Zhang, Walsh, & Bonnefon, 2005), and 
the scenario was adjusted to be about the self rather than about others to address possible actor-
observer biases (Hsee & Weber, 1997; Malle, 2006). In Experiments 3 and 4 we also changed the 
traditional dichotomous choice to a scale. The consistent findings across the four experiments 
with moderate to strong effect size show support for the generalizability of findings across 
experimental designs. However, we note that the effect size could vary as a result of design, and 
future research should take these possible moderators into account in designing follow-up 
studies. 
Conclusion 
The widely replicated classic action-effect posits that negative outcomes resulting from 
action are regretted more than when resulting from inaction (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). But, 
social norms matter. Building on the theoretical arguments made by norm theory (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986), our findings from four experiments clearly show that the action-effect is strongest 
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when social norms are for inaction, but is weakened and even reversed when social norms are for 
action.  
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Experiment 3: Means and standard deviations for perceived regret 
 Action decision Inaction decision Cohen d Total 
Action Society 4.16 (1.95) [32] 4.89 (1.42) [28] -.43 4.50 (1.75) [60] 
Inaction Society 5.46 (.86) [26] 2.30 (2.20) [30] 1.89 3.77 (2.33) [56] 
Cohen d -.86 1.40 - .35 
Total 4.74 (1.68) [58] 4.55 (2.26) [58] .60 4.15 (2.07) [116] 
Note. Parentheses indicate standard deviation. Brackets indicate the number of participants. 
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Table 2 
 










 N M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Action norms 110 4.65 1.06 4.05 1.24 3.98 1.31 3.60 1.40 
Inaction norms 110 1.94 1.16 3.89 1.42 3.65 1.40 4.34 1.26 
Control 109 3.25 1.02 4.13 1.26 3.89 1.20 4.07 1.22 




.52 .01 .01 .05 
Note: *** p < .001; **. p < 0.01; *. p < 0.05.  
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Table 3 
 
Experiment 4: Comparisons between conditions on justification and regret 
 Action-inaction Action-control Inaction-control 
 Diff d Diff d Diff d 





























Note: *** p < .001; **. p < 0.01; *. p < 0.05. Diff indicates mean difference; d stands for 
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Table 4 
 
Summary of studies and main findings 
# N Manipulation Inaction 
norms 
Control Action norms Effect 
size d  
Contribution 




72%a 56%a .75 Baseline effect  




70.7%a 48%a .91 Direct replication; 
intent manipulation 





 Regret:  
Inaction > 
Action 
1.15 Conceptual replication; 
Action-inaction 
manipulation 






.56 Descriptive norms; 
Addressing justification 
Note: a value indicates the percent of people who perceived higher regret for action than for 
inaction; *** p < .001; **. p < 0.01; *. p < 0.05. Effect size d is calculated as contrasts between 
action versus inaction (Experiment 1,2, and 4) or the interaction (Experiment 3), and is converted 
from chi-square and ηp2 values.  







Figure 1. Experiment 1 plots of the perceived norms and perceived regret. The first plot indicates 
the percentage of participants choosing either action or inaction as the perceived norms 
(manipulation check). The second plot indicates the percentage of participants choosing either 
inaction Paul or action George as experienced higher regret following the negative outcome.  
 
  









Figure 2. Experiment 2 plots of the manipulation check and perceived regret. The first two plots 
indicate the percentage of participants choosing either action or inaction as the perceived norms. 
The third and fourth plots indicate the percentage of participants choosing either inaction Paul or 
action George as experienced higher regret following the negative outcome. “Not random” 
indicates that the decision was decided by George and Paul, and “Random coin toss” indicates 
that the decision was decided based on a random coin toss. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 3 plot of perceived regret (0 = Not at all; 6 = Very much). Error bars 
indicate standard error. 
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Figure 4. Experiment 4 plot of perceived regret for action over inaction (1 = higher regret for 
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Experiments 1 and 2 
Our experimental paradigm was based on the Zeelenberg et al. (2002) studies which also 
manipulated normality of the action-effect (although, we note, the prior outcomes normality, not 
social norms normality, see introduction for more detail). In Study 1 the authors reported three 
normality conditions with percentages of 91%, 78%, and 31%, which resulted in an effect size w of 
.39. Using G*Power 3.1.9.2 and settings of 0.8 power and alpha of .05 we calculated a required 
sample of 64 to detect normality using a 3-conditions chi-square experimental design.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 followed with a similar experimental paradigm to Zeelenberg et al. (2002) Study 2. 
Their Study 2 showed an even greater effect for a manipulated (rather than a compared) action 
versus inaction in which they examined an interaction with statistics of F(2,72) = 21.32. The strong 
effect with power analysis indicated an even smaller sample size than that for Experiments 1 and 2. 
To be conservative, we then based our effect estimates on our results from Experiment 1. We 
converted Experiment 1's chi-square of 6.32 (N=76) to Cohen d of .60 and F of .3. Using G*Power 
3.1.9.2 for 0.8 power and alpha of .05, the power analysis showed that the sample size required for a 
2x2 in Experiment 3 is 111. 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 aimed at achieving higher power (0.99) to discover the smallest effect d = .60 found in 
Experiment 1 (f = .30), indicated a required sample of 243. We therefore set to collect atleast 100 
participants per condition, 300 overall. 
  




Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for A&M Finance. A&M Finance strongly 
emphasizes actions and proactive decision making, shows a clear preference for action over inaction, 
and evaluates its employees based on their ability to act and actively seek out good investments.   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,000,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.  
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,000,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B. 
Inaction condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for B&N Finance. B&N Finance strongly 
emphasizes cautious and responsible decision making, shows a clear preference for inaction over 
action, and evaluates its employees based on their ability to refrain from undertaking bad 
investments.  
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,000,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.  
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,000,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B. 
Control condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for C&O Finance. C&O Finance strongly 
emphasizes performance. 
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,000,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.  
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,000,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B. 
Quiz comprehension questions 
Participants had to answer the following questions correctly before proceeding to the attributions 
questions. 
What does the company Paul and George work for emphasize:?  
1. Taking action to find good investments 
2. Refraining from bad decisions 
3. Learning 
4. Performance 
Paul's final investment decision involved which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
George's final investment decision involved which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
At the end, Paul was invested in which company? 
1. Company A 
2. Company B 
3. Company C 
At the end, George was invested in which company? 
1. Company A 
2. Company B 
3. Company C 
Attribution questions 
Who do you think the company considers to be a better stock broker? 
1. Paul 
2. George 






Intent action condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for A&M Finance. Most, if not all, of the stock 
traders working for A&M Finance are very action-driven, eager and proactive decision makers, 
strongly valuing action over inaction. The norms in this company are for people to keep looking for 
new opportunities for investment with the unofficial motto of "go for it!".   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,200,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,200,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B.   
Intent inaction condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for B&N Finance. Most, if not all, of the stock 
traders working for B&N Finance are very careful and cautious decision makers, strongly valuing the 
status-quo over taking action. The norms in this company are for people to not act unless they are 
certain it is necessary, with the unofficial motto of "if it isn't broken, don't fix it!".   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,200,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,200,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B. 
Intent control condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for C&O Finance.    
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,200,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,200,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B.   
No intent action condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for A&M Finance. Most, if not all, of the stock 
traders working for A&M Finance are very action-driven, eager and proactive decision makers, 
strongly valuing action over inaction. The norms in this company are for people to keep looking for 
new opportunities for investment with the unofficial motto of "go for it!".   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but at the end he could not decide whether to switch his initial 
investment or not so he left it all to chance by tossing a coin. The coin indicated that he should keep 
his investment in company A.  He now finds out that the investment would have been better off by 
$1,200,000 if the result of the coin toss would have instructed him to switch to the stock of company 
C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he considered switching 
to invest stock in company A, but at the end he could not decide whether to switch his initial 
investment or not so he left it all to chance by tossing a coin. The coin indicated that he should 
switch his investment to company A.  He now finds out that the investment would have been better 
off by $1,200,000 if the result of the coin toss would have instructed him to not switch to the stock 
of company A.      
No intent inaction condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for B&N Finance. Most, if not all, of the stock 
traders working for B&N Finance are very careful and cautious decision makers, strongly valuing the 
status-quo over taking action. The norms in this company are for people to not act unless they are 
certain it is necessary, with the unofficial motto of "if it isn't broken, don't fix it!".   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but at the end he could not decide whether to switch his initial 
investment or not so he left it all to chance by tossing a coin. The coin indicated that he should keep 
his investment in company A.  He now finds out that the investment would have been better off by 
$1,200,000 if the result of the coin toss would have instructed him to switch to the stock of company 
C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he considered switching 
to invest stock in company A, but at the end he could not decide whether to switch his initial 
investment or not so he left it all to chance by tossing a coin. The coin indicated that he should 
switch his investment to company A.  He now finds out that the investment would have been better 
off by $1,200,000 if the result of the coin toss would have instructed him to not switch to the stock 
of company A.     
No intent control condition 
Mr. Paul and Mr. George are stock traders who work for C&O Finance.   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but at the end he could not decide whether to switch his initial 
investment or not so he left it all to chance by tossing a coin. The coin indicated that he should keep 
his investment in company A.  He now finds out that the investment would have been better off by 
$1,200,000 if the result of the coin toss would have instructed him to switch to the stock of company 
C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he considered switching 
to invest stock in company A, but at the end he could not decide whether to switch his initial 
investment or not so he left it all to chance by tossing a coin. The coin indicated that he should 
switch his investment to company A.  He now finds out that the investment would have been better 
off by $1,200,000 if the result of the coin toss would have instructed him to not switch to the stock 
of company A.    
Quiz comprehension questions for intent conditions 
Participants had to answer the following questions correctly before proceeding to the attributions 
questions. 
What does the company Paul and George work for emphasize?  
1. Taking action to find good investments 
2. Refraining from bad decisions 
3. Learning 
4. Performance 
Paul's final investment decision involved which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
George's final investment decision involved which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
At the end, Paul and George both had finally invested in which company? 
1. Company A 
2. Company B 
3. Company C 
Quiz comprehension questions for no intent conditions 
Participants had to answer the following questions correctly before proceeding to the attributions 
questions. 
What does the company Paul and George work for emphasize?  
1. Taking action to find good investments 
2. Refraining from bad decisions 
3. Learning 
4. Performance 
Paul's coin toss resulted in which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
George's coin toss resulted in which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
At the end, Paul and George both had finally invested in which company? 
1. Company A 
2. Company B 
3. Company C 
Attribution questions 
Whose decision is probably more common in this company? 
1. Paul 
2. George 





Action society – action decision condition 
Imagine a society that is mostly driven by action. Most, if not all, of the people living in this society 
are very proactive and action-oriented, strongly valuing action over inaction. The norms in this 
society are for people to keep busy and minimize idle time.      
Now try and imagine that you are a member of such society, and that you are experiencing the 
following situation:    
You are a member of this action-driven society and have recently inherited 1,000,000US$ which 
were already invested in the stocks of company Y. Credible reports indicated that the stock of a 
different company, company X, shows greater promise and potential for earnings. You have taken 
action and changed the investment from company Y to company X. At the end of the year you 
realize that you would have been better off by 200,000US$ had you not made the switch in 
investment. 
Action society – inaction decision condition 
Imagine a society that is mostly driven by action. Most, if not all, of the people living in this society 
are very proactive and action-oriented, strongly valuing action over inaction. The norms in this 
society are for people to keep busy and minimize idle time.      
Now try and imagine that you are a member of such society, and that you are experiencing the 
following situation:    
You are a member of this action-driven society and have recently inherited 1,000,000US$ which 
were already invested in the stocks of company X. Credible reports indicated that the stock of a 
different company, company Z, shows greater promise and potential for earnings. However, you 
have not taken action and left the investment in company X instead of shifting the investment to 
company Z. At the end of the year you realize that you would have been better off by 200,000US$ 
had you decided to make the switch in investment. 
Inaction society – action decision condition 
Imagine a society that is mostly driven by inaction. Most, if not all, of the people living in this society 
are very passive and oriented towards inaction, strongly valuing the status-quo over taking action. 
The norms in this society are for people to refrain from action and maximize idle time.      
Now try and imagine that you are a member of such society, and that you are experiencing the 
following situation:    
You are a member of this inaction-driven society and have recently inherited 1,000,000US$ which 
were already invested in the stocks of company Y. Credible reports indicated that the stock of a 
different company, company X, shows greater promise and potential for earnings. You have taken 
action and changed the investment from company Y to company X. At the end of the year you 
realize that you would have been better off by 200,000US$ had you not made the switch in 
investment. 
Inaction society – inaction decision condition 
Imagine a society that is mostly driven by inaction. Most, if not all, of the people living in this society 
are very passive and oriented towards inaction, strongly valuing the status-quo over taking action. 
The norms in this society are for people to refrain from action and maximize idle time.      
Now try and imagine that you are a member of such society, and that you are experiencing the 
following situation:    
You are a member of this inaction-driven society and have recently inherited a 1,000,000US$ which 
were already invested in the stocks of company X. Credible reports indicated that the stock of a 
different company, company Z, shows greater promise and potential for earnings. However, you 
have not taken action and left the investment in company X instead of shifting the investment to 
company Z. At the end of the year you realize that you would have been better off by 200,000US$ 
had you decided to make the switch in investment. 
Quiz comprehension questions 
Participants had to answer the following questions correctly before proceeding to the attributions 
questions. 





In such a society, how likely are you to feel regret over your behavior in this situation? 





Paul and George are cousins who grew up in a family that values action. Most, if not all, of the family 
members are very proactive and action-oriented, strongly valuing taking action over inaction. The 
norms in this family are for family members to keep busy and minimize idle time.   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,200,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,200,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B.    
Paul and George's investment decisions are private, but the outcomes are public. Meaning, that the 
family never knows of the investment decisions made at any time, and Paul and George do not know 
of each other's decisions, but everyone in the family knows about the outcomes of both investment 
decisions.   
Inaction condition 
Paul and George are cousins who grew up in a family that values inaction. Most, if not all, of the 
family members are very passive and oriented towards inaction, strongly valuing the status--quo 
over taking action. The norms in this family are for family members to refrain from unnecessary 
action and maximize idle time.   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,200,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,200,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B.    
Paul and George's investment decisions are private, but the outcomes are public. Meaning, that the 
family never knows of the investment decisions made at any time, and Paul and George do not know 
of each other's decisions, but everyone in the family knows about the outcomes of both investment 
decisions. 
Control condition 
Paul and George are cousins who grew up in the same family.   
Paul has made the decision to invest in company A. During the past year he considered switching to 
invest stock in company C, but he decided against it. He now finds out that the investment would 
have been better off by $1,200,000 if he had switched to the stock of company C.   
George has made the decision to invest in company B. During the past year he switched the 
investment to stock in company A. He now finds out that the investment would have been better off 
by $1,200,000 if he had kept his investment in stock for company B.    
Paul and George's investment decisions are private, but the outcomes are public. Meaning, that the 
family never knows of the investment decisions made at any time, and Paul and George do not know 
of each other's decisions, but everyone in the family knows about the outcomes of both investment 
decisions.       
Quiz comprehension questions 
Participants had to answer the following questions correctly before proceeding to the attributions 
questions. 
What best describes Paul and George's family:  
1. Driven by action 
2. Driven by inaction 
3. Driven by love 
Paul and George's investment decision regarding whether to switch the investment or not are... 
1. Private 
2. Public 
3. We don't know 
The outcomes of Paul and George's investment decision are... 
1. Private 
2. Public 
3. We don't know  
Paul's final investment decision involved which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
George's final investment decision involved which of the following? 
1. Switching investments 
2. Not switching investments 
At the end, Paul and George both had finally invested in which company? 
1. Company A 
2. Company B 
Attribution questions 
Whose decision is probably more common in Paul and George's family? 
1. Definitely Paul's decision NOT to switch 
2. Most likely Paul's decision NOT to switch 
3. Probably Paul's decision NOT to switch 
4. Probably George's decision to switch 
5. Most likely George's decision to switch 
6. Definitely George's decision to switch 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement - Paul's decision not to switch the 
investment is well justified 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree  
5. Somewhat agree  
6. Agree 
7. Strongly agree 
Please rate your agreement with the following statement - George's decision to switch the 
investment is well justified 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Neither agree nor disagree 
5. Somewhat agree  
6. Agree 
7. Strongly agree 
In your opinion, who feels greater regret over his investment decision? 
1. Definitely Paul 
2. Most likely Paul 
3. Probably Paul 
4. Probably George 
5. Most likely George 
6. Definitely George 
How common is a family like Paul and George's family in the country where you currently live? 
0 = Very rare or none at all; 5 = Extremely common 
 
  
Procedure and data disclosures  
Data collection 
In all experiments, data collection was completed before conducting an analysis of the data. 
Data exclusions 
In Experiments 1, 2, and 4 participants had to answer the comprehension checks correctly in order 
to proceed with the experiment. In Experiment 3 answering correctly was not a prerequisite for 
proceeding, and seven participants answered incorrectly and were therefore excluded for failing the 
comprehension checks. The exclusions are reported in methods section of Experiment 3. We 
indicated that “removing these participants did not significantly affect the results”.  
Below are the results of the full sample: 
 Action decision Inaction decision Total 
Action Society 4.12 (1.93) [33] 4.93 (1.41) [29] 4.50 (1.74) [62] 
Inaction Society 5.34 (.90) [29] 3.29 (2.16) [31] 3.77 (2.27) [60] 
Total 4.69 (1.65) [62] 4.57 (2.26) [60] 4.14 (2.04) [122] 
 
Conditions reporting 
All collected conditions are reported. 
Variables reporting 
The purpose of the study was to examine how a manipulation of social norms impacts the action-
effect. In the data collection, we also collected data examining the broader perceived social norms 
for action-action for possible future studies. Therefore, Experiments 1 and 2 included an additional 
separate section at the end asking participants about the perceived social norms more broadly in 
society, e.g. “In your country of residence, do you think people are generally more oriented towards 
action or towards inaction?” (1 – Action; 2 – Inaction).  
As discussed in the general discussion section, after running Experiments 1 and 2 we identified the 
possibility of a cognitive bias in that leads to a shift of perceived norms of negative outcomes from 
action more broadly to inaction in decision-making scenarios with negative outcomes. Therefore, in 
Experiment 3 manipulating society-level norms and before the presentation of the action and 
inaction manipulations, we asked about perceptions of society more broadly and related attributions 
(e.g., “How similar is this society to the society in the country where you currently live?”).  
 
